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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this case, we must examine whether there is any basis 
to justify the introduction into evidence of an anonymous 
note that was plainly hearsay. Appellant Byron Mitchell, 
who was convicted of conspiracy to commit and 
commission of Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 1951, and use of and carrying a firearm during a crime of 
violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 924(c), contends that 
the district court committed reversible error by permitting 
an anonymous note linking him to the getaway car to be 
admitted into evidence as a present sense impression, an 
excited utterance, or a statement containing sufficient 
indicia of reliability under the residual catch all exception 
previously sited in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24). 
 
I. 
 
The facts which appear not to be disputed are that 
between 9:00 a.m. and 9:15 a.m. on September 12, 1991 
two men waited in a check cashing store at 29th and 
Girard Avenue in North Philadelphia, when an armored 
truck made a delivery of currency to the store. The 
assailants were armed with handguns and attacked the 
delivery man as he entered the store, robbing him of 
currency in excess of $20,000. The two men fled the scene 
in a beige car driven by a third person, and engaged in 
gunfire with those in the armored truck before they sped 
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away. There was evidence that the two men who robbed the 
agency were William Robinson and Terrance Stewart, both 
dead at the time of trial. Mitchell was indicted on the theory 
that he was the third conspirator and operator of the 
getaway car. 
 
During trial, the police officers testified that at 9:37 a.m. 
on September 12, 1991 the 911 radio room received an 
anonymous call in which the caller stated: "[I]n the 1660 
block . . . of 32nd street, these guys just dumped this beige 
car. Apparently, they stole it [be]cause they jumped into 
another car and took off." The caller also gave the license 
plate number of the deserted car, which turned out to be 
the beige getaway car that had been seen at the scene of 
the robbery. That car had been stolen shortly before the 
robbery at a gas station not far from the site of the robbery. 
 
At 10:00 a.m., based on the 911 call, police officers found 
the beige car where the 911 caller had stated it was. A 
search by FBI agents recovered latent fingerprints and two 
anonymous notes from the front seat. One note contained 
the license plate number of the getaway car itself, ZPR-274, 
and is not challenged on appeal.1 The other note, which is 
the subject of this appeal, stated: "Light green ZPJ-254. 
They changed cars; this is the other car." A check on the 
light green car revealed that it was a green 1978 Buick 
registered to Anita Young, then fiancee and later wife of 
defendant Mitchell. 
 
That afternoon, an FBI agent who was part of a 
surveillance unit searching for that car observed Mitchell 
park the green Buick and enter Young's house. He exited 
shortly thereafter and drove away, with the agent following 
him. When the agent had grounds for a stop because of 
traffic violations, he searched Mitchell who was carrying 
$1,400 dollars in small bills. He also had a receipt from a 
lawyer for a $600 payment in cash which was made earlier 
that day. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Although Mitchell does not challenge the admissibility of the 911 call 
or the note containing only the tag number of the getaway car, he argues 
that they too were erroneously admitted into evidence for the same 
reason as was the note indicating the switch of cars. 
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In addition to the testimony about the note referencing 
the light green car that led the authorities directly to 
Mitchell, the government presented testimony from Kim 
Chester, the girlfriend of Robinson, one of the other two 
robbers, who testified that in early September she 
overheard the three men discuss the robbery and discuss 
who had a gun and the need to get a car for the robbery. 
She further testified that while she was waiting for a bus on 
the morning of September 12, 1991, Robinson, Stewart and 
Mitchell drove by in Anita Young's green car and picked 
Chester up before 8:00 a.m. and drove her to work. While 
in the car, she heard them discussing how to obtain a 
getaway car, and heard Mitchell say he was not going to 
use Young's car for that purpose. 
 
The government also presented testimony of Duane 
Johnson, an FBI agent specializing in fingerprint analysis, 
who testified that there were nine points of similarity 
between two of the fingerprints found in the getaway car 
and those taken from Mitchell. One fingerprint was on the 
outside door handle and the other was on the gear shift of 
the car. Agent Johnson conceded that it was common to 
have up to one hundred points of comparison when 
identifying an individual by fingerprint, but stated that he 
had made identifications on as little as seven. 
 
Except for the testimony of Eileen Lamper, who testified 
that Mitchell was friends with one of the other robbers 
(thus supporting Chester's testimony), the other witnesses 
did not inculpate Mitchell per se; they established that the 
crime did happen, how it happened, and how it was 
investigated. 
 
Mitchell sought exclusion of the anonymous note and 
certain other evidence before trial. He contended that the 
note was inadmissible hearsay and that its admission 
violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 
The district court overruled the objections, and the note 
was admitted. Mitchell was convicted by the jury on each 
count, and was sentenced to 24 years imprisonment, three 
years of supervised release, a special assessment of $150, 
and was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of 
$19,100.00. 
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We have jurisdiction over this direct appeal pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
II. 
 
The district court held that the anonymous note 
referencing the light green car was admissible as an 
exception to the hearsay rule as a present sense impression 
or an excited utterance or under the catch all exception in 
section 803(24) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Our 
standard of review is plenary, both because we are 
considering whether the district court correctly interpreted 
the Federal Rules of Evidence and relevant case law, see 
United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 199 (3d Cir. 1992) 
("[t]o the extent the district court's admission of evidence 
was based on an interpretation of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence our standard of review is plenary") and because 
Mitchell's challenge implicates the Confrontation Clause, 
see Government of the Virgin Islands v. Joseph, 964 F.2d 
1380, 1385 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
A. 
 
Present Sense Impression and Excited Utterance  
 
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) provides that a present 
sense impression is admissible so long as it is"a statement 
describing or explaining an event or condition made while 
the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or 
immediately thereafter." Fed. R. Evid. 803(1) (emphasis 
added). There are three principal requirements which must 
be met before hearsay evidence may be admitted as a 
present sense impression: (1) the declarant must h ave 
personally perceived the event described; (2) the declaration 
must be an explanation or description of the event rather 
than a narration; and (3) the declaration and the event 
described must be contemporaneous. See 5 J. McLaughlin, 
Weinstein's Federal Evidence S 803.03 (2d ed. 1997); 2 J. 
Strong, McCormick on Evidence S 271 (4th ed. 1992). 
 
To qualify as an excited utterance, the Rule requires that 
it be "[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition 
 
                                5 
  
made while the declarant was under the stress of 
excitement caused by the event or condition." Fed. R. Evid. 
803(2). The requirements for a hearsay statement to 
constitute an excited utterance are: (1) a startli ng occasion, 
(2) a statement relating to the circumstances of t he 
startling occasion, (3) a declarant who appears to  have had 
opportunity to observe personally the events, and (4) a 
statement made before there has been time to reflect and 
fabricate. See 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence SS 1750-51 (J. 
Chadbourne rev. 1976). 
 
Both Rules 803(1) and (2) share certain requirements. 
One of the principal requirements is that the declarant 
personally perceived the event or condition about which the 
statement is made. See Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507, 511 
(3d Cir. 1985) (personal perception a key element to the 
excited utterance exception); Bemis v. Edwards, 45 F.3d 
1369, 1372-73 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating same for both the 
present sense impression and excited utterance exceptions). 
In addition, both hearsay exceptions have temporal 
limitations which limit admissibility of certain statements. 
See Bemis, 45 F.3d at 1372. 
 
Mitchell's principal challenge to the admission of the 
anonymous note is that there is no evidence that the 
person who wrote the note personally perceived what it 
described. In support, Mitchell cites our opinion in Miller, 
754 F.2d at 511, which presented facts similar to those 
here, as the statement at issue was anonymous. 
 
In Miller, we stated that "[a] party seeking to introduce 
[an anonymous statement] carries a burden heavier than 
where the declarant is identified to demonstrate the 
statement's circumstantial trustworthiness." Miller, 754 
F.2d at 510. We further emphasized: "circumstantial 
evidence of the declarant's personal perception must not be 
so scanty as to forfeit the `guarantees of trustworthiness' 
which form the hallmark of all exceptions to the hearsay 
rule." Id. at 511. 
 
In Miller, the trial court admitted a statement of an 
unidentified bystander at the scene of an automobile 
accident. Contradictory testimony was provided as to whose 
fault the accident was. Plaintiff sought the admission of the 
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statement of the unidentified person who said, "the bastard 
cut in," and sought by that statement to establish that the 
accident was caused by the actions of defendant. Id. at 509. 
 
On appeal we reversed, holding that admission of the 
anonymous statement was erroneous because the record 
was "empty of any circumstances from which the trial court 
could have inferred, by a preponderance, that the declarant 
saw [the defendant] `cut in.' " Id. at 511 (emphasis added). 
We found the trial court erred in inferring personal 
perception on the ground that the declarant would have 
made the declaration only if he was in a position to do so. 
Instead, we stated that the words of the statement, or the 
circumstances surrounding the event, "do not show more 
likely than not that the declarant saw the event." Id. 
Inasmuch as it was equally likely that the unidentified 
declarant was "hypothesizing or repeating what someone 
else had said," id., the statement was inadmissible as an 
excited utterance. 
 
Miller is dispositive here. Although the government 
argues that "[a] common sense reading of the note suggests 
that the person writing the note was perceiving the event 
and in close proximity," appellee's br. at 14, the record here 
is devoid of circumstances indicating by a preponderance 
that the author of the anonymous note actually saw 
Mitchell change cars. Thus, the requirement of personal 
perception necessary for both the present sense impression 
and excited utterance exceptions to the hearsay rule is not 
satisfied. 
 
In light of our conclusion, the issue of the temporal 
limitations of the exceptions is less critical. Nonetheless, we 
note that there is also no evidence to suggest that the 
unidentified writer of the note made the statement before 
s/he had time to reflect and fabricate. The time lapse 
between the robbery and the writing of the note is not clear. 
Because the robbery occurred between 9:00 a.m. and 9:15 
a.m. and the notes were found in the getaway car a mile 
away from the scene of the robbery at approximately 10:00 
a.m. there could have been a 40 minute time span, 
probably too long for applicability of the present sense 
exception. Therefore, the government cannot rely on a 
hearsay exception which requires the statement to be made 
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virtually contemporaneously with the event being perceived. 
See, e.g., 2 Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal 
Evidence S 803.1 (4th ed. 1996) ("the theory underlying the 
present sense impression is that substantial 
contemporaneity minimizes unreliability due to defective 
recollection or conscious fabrication"). 
 
Of course, if the writer and the 911 caller were the same, 
and the notes were left shortly before the 911 call at 9:37, 
the temporal limitation might have been satisfied. See 
McCurdy v. Greyhound Corporation, 346 F.2d 224, 226 (3d 
Cir. 1965) (statement admissible under the excited 
utterance exception even though it was made ten or fifteen 
minutes after an accident); United States v. Blakey, 607 
F.2d 779 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding admissible a statement 
made up to 23 minutes after it was observed as a present 
sense impression), overruled in part on other grounds, Idaho 
v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990). However, given the total 
lack of information regarding the circumstances of the 
note's creation, the trial court could not reasonably find 
that there was no time to fabricate the statement. 
 
We note that there are other problems as to admission of 
the note as an excited utterance. There was no indication 
that the author was under the stress of excitement when 
s/he wrote the note (or when the 911 call was made), a 
requirement of the excited utterance exception."The 
assumption underlying the hearsay exception of Rule 803 
(2) is that a person under the sway of excitement 
temporarily loses the capacity of reflection and thus 
produced statements free of fabrication." Miller, 754 F.2d at 
512. Further, there is no evidence that the parking of the 
beige car was a shocking or exciting event. 
 
For all of the above reasons, we feel bound to conclude 
that it was error to introduce the anonymous note as either 
a present sense impression or an excited utterance 
exception to the hearsay rule. 
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B. 
 
The Residual Catch All Exception 
 
The district court also held that the anonymous note was 
admissible under the residual exception to the hearsay 
rule, which at the time of trial was found in Fed. R. Evid. 
803(24) and which was transferred to new Rule 807 
effective December 1, 1997. There was no substantive 
change in the transfer, and we will refer to the Rule as it 
was when considered by the district court. Rule 803(24) 
provides that a statement not specifically covered by any of 
the traditional hearsay exceptions is admissible if the court 
determines that the statement is offered as evidence of a 
material fact, there is no other obtainable evidence on the 
issue that is more probative, that the interests of justice 
will be served by its admission, and that the record reflects 
"equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" for 
the reliability of the statement. Fed. R. Evid. 803(24).2 
 
The legislative history of Rule 803(24) indicates that 
Congress " `intended that the residual hearsay exceptions 
will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional 
circumstances.' " S. Rep. No. 93-1277, Committee on the 
Judiciary, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A., Fed. R. Evid. 803, 
Historical Note, at 276. Furthermore, the statement must 
not only meet the rigors of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. As presently framed, Rule 807 provides: 
 
       A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 but 
       having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is 
       not excluded by the hearsay rule, if the court determines that 
       (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a mate rial fact; (B) 
the 
       statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered 
than 
       any other evidence which the proponent can procure through 
       reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes o f these rules 
and 
       the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the 
       statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted 
       under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the 
       adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to 
       provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to 
meet 
       it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the 
       particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant. 
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but also of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment. Finally, the Supreme Court has determined 
that such statements are " `presumptively unreliable and 
inadmissible for Confrontation Clause purposes.' " Idaho v. 
Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 818 (1990) (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 
476 U.S. 530, 543 (1986)).3 
 
Although the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause 
protect similar values, see id. at 814, the Confrontation 
Clause has a broader reach barring the admission of some 
evidence that would otherwise be admissible under 
exceptions to the hearsay rules. See California v. Green, 
399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970). Before a statement will be 
admissible, the prosecution must show that "it bears 
adequate `indicia of reliability.' " Wright, 497 U.S. at 814-15. 
The "indicia of reliability" requirement can be met if the 
hearsay statement either falls within a firmly rooted 
hearsay exception or if it is supported by a showing of 
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
 
By definition, the residual hearsay exception is not a 
firmly rooted hearsay exception. See Joseph , 964 F.2d at 
1386-87 (citing Wright, 497 U.S. at 817). The district court 
found the requisite trustworthiness from other evidence it 
considered to be corroborating, i.e., by "the locating of the 
fingerprints of defendant Mr. Mitchell, and his operating 
the described vehicle [ ] in a short distance away from th[e] 
area at a later point that afternoon." App. at 652. In so 
finding, the district court erred as a matter of law because 
"under the Confrontation Clause, hearsay evidence used to 
convict a defendant must possess indicia of reliability by 
virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to 
other evidence at trial." Wright, 497 U.S. at 822. "[T]he use 
of corroborating evidence to support a hearsay statement's 
`particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' would permit 
admission of a presumptively unreliable statement by 
bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of other evidence at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, made applicable to 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides: "In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted 
with 
the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
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trial." Id. at 823. Cf. United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 
349 (3d Cir. 1978) (corroborating evidence could not satisfy 
requirement of "equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness" 
under residual hearsay exception). The theory supporting 
admissibility is that "the declarant's truthfulness is so clear 
from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross- 
examination would be of marginal utility." Wright, 497 U.S. 
at 820. As the Supreme Court noted, the presence of 
corroborating evidence "more appropriately indicates that 
any error in admitting the statement might be harmless, 
rather than that any basis exists for presuming the 
declarant to be trustworthy." Id. at 823 (internal citation 
omitted). 
 
Mitchell argues that evaluation of the trustworthiness of 
the anonymous note reveals that the circumstances 
surrounding its creation do not possess sufficient 
guarantees of trustworthiness permitting its admission into 
evidence. As he points out, the government failed to 
produce any evidence as to who authored the note or the 
circumstances under which it was written. Thus, the 
government failed to meet its burden of showing that cross 
examination of the author of the note would have been of 
marginal utility to Mitchell. 
 
The circumstances to which the government points to 
show particularized guarantees of trustworthiness are all 
other facts proven at trial, i.e. that the getaway car used in 
the robbery was found where the 911 caller claimed and 
that the caller stated that the people in the getaway car 
drove off in another car. These are not circumstances 
surrounding the making of the note and, under the holding 
of Idaho v. Wright, cannot be used to support admission of 
the evidence. We must therefore conclude that the 
admission of the anonymous note failed also to meet the 
requirements of the residual catch all hearsay exception 
and its incorporation of the Confrontation Clause, and was 
error. 
 
III. 
 
Harmless Error 
 
Not all error is reversible. We must therefore decide 
whether the erroneous admission of the anonymous note 
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into evidence constituted harmless error. Although the 
admission of inadmissible hearsay constitutes 
nonconstitutional error and is reviewed under a lesser 
standard than when constitutional error is made, see 
Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1500 (3d Cir. 1993); 
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 
283-84 (3d Cir. 1976), in this case we must apply the 
standard which governs constitutional errors as set forth in 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Under this 
standard, the government must demonstrate "beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict obtained." Id. at 24. It is the 
government's burden of persuasion on whether an error is 
harmless, an issue the government failed to address in its 
brief. 
 
Mitchell argues that the note could not be considered 
harmless because it constituted the government's most 
powerful piece of evidence, as it was the one thing that led 
the police directly to him. He then argues that the 
testimony provided by the fingerprint expert, although 
damaging, could not have been the basis of the jury's 
decision because it was questioned by the jury, and the 
testimony of Kim Chester was unreliable. Mitchell therefore 
asserts that the anonymous note must have contributed "in 
some manner" to the jury's decision to convict. 
 
Although we may not accept Mitchell's characterization of 
the note as the "most powerful" evidence, we cannot 
disregard its effect. There were problems with the evidence 
on which the government relies. The FBI agent who testified 
at trial conceded that the latent fingerprints found in the 
beige getaway car were in a "fragile" and "erode[d]" 
condition. App. at 342a, 453. He based his opinion of the 
match on a finding of only nine points of similarity between 
these prints and the prints taken from Mitchell at the 
station house. He further testified that the fewest points of 
similarity that he had ever previously based an opinion 
upon was seven and that he had never heard of anyone 
basing an opinion upon fewer. Moreover, while the jurors 
were deliberating, they sent a note to the judge that they 
were "struggling with . . . agent Johnson's testimony about 
fingerprints." App. at 653. 
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The testimony of Chester was certainly incriminating, but 
on cross examination, Chester conceded that she was a liar 
and a thief and that, at the time of the robbery, she used 
drugs. This prompted the district court to instruct the jury 
that Chester's testimony was to be considered with caution 
and careful scrutiny. App. at 600-01. Although $1,400 was 
found on Mitchell when he was arrested, those bills could 
not be linked to the money stolen at the check cashing 
store because those serial numbers had not been recorded 
by the armored car company. Also, although there is some 
indication from the parties' briefs that Young gave 
incriminating statements against Mitchell during the 
investigation of the robbery, her testimony was not elicited 
at trial because she claimed her marital privilege, having 
married Mitchell a month after the robbery. 
 
In light of the legitimate questions raised as to the 
remaining evidence admitted at trial, we are compelled to 
conclude that although there was circumstantial evidence 
corroborating the anonymous note, the government has not 
demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
admission of the note did not contribute to the jury's 
verdict. 
 
IV. 
 
For the reasons set forth, we will vacate the judgment of 
Mitchell's conviction and remand to the district court for a 
new trial. 
 
A True Copy: 
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